VARIOUS CURRENT CRISIS IDENTIFICATIONS
The present situation presents a great contras 4-: there is today no assurance that different analysts are addressing their thoughts and words to the Stme phenomenon. There are many different meanings and emphases. A confusing situation exists to the extent that one is well advised to go through the tiresome prelude of setting forth one's own definition before launching any other discussion. The variety of current meanings is readily illustrated. Two writings mentioned earlier specify present and future crisis perspectives in a way to puzzle those whose orientations are backward-looking to the Cold War series of confrontations. Edward Morse, for example, has declared that the kinds of "high politics" and security crises that everybody expected in the 19b0's simply did not appear. Instead, in his view, economic crises took their place in the sixties. The new type was manifested in multinational conference rooms instead of on battlefields and national borders and had to do with "low" matters such as the prices of products, agricultural policy, and monetary problems. Tho French, in Morse's interpretation, became masters at instigating crises in order to advance their own national purposes.
The authors, quoted earlier in the passage saying that crises are difficult to define but that the definitional problem could be set aside sa f ely, provide the names of topics they think may reach "crisis proportions" in the future: "worldwide inflation, worldwide resource shortages, extensive famine, and the inexorable quest for more deadly weapons..." (7) There is occasion for some anxiety about communication when we gather together under the crisis rubric such diverse circumstances as the Suez Crisis of 1956, the manipulative strategies of French negotiators at international conferences, and the future possibility of extensive famln». Where is the common ground? There are disorders of a similar kind in crisis identification even when the perspective is held to the simpler and more understandable environment of the Cold War period. Two governmental insiders wrote an informative article in *P» !^i P"^^l«WW»Ä«w»"W"''»-»--T^~"^*»«^BIPP(^p( 
THt CÜMMUN ÜKOUND IN THE JNÜERSTANÜIHG OF CRISIS
•lost basic to the common understanding Is ..he extension of tne medical analocy. This Is the "turning point" theme and It Is drawn, obviously, from the situation of the victim of an acute disease who has come to the critical stage between recovery and death. The Image Is projected conventionally to both private and public affairs without special consideration or worries over exact meaning. "The worst crisis In Cambodia since the ceasefire," "Six Crises," anu the "The American Crisis" are example expressions found in ordinary discourse. The simplest transfer of the Image to international politics occurs In references tc the transition from peace to war. (11) Nevertheless, it seems likely that the strongest rneanlnüs in the ordinary usage of the crisis concept are not those oriented to transitional phases (peace-war, recovery-death, etc.), but are.
Instead, directed to the psychological accompaniments: "feelings" of mingled hope and tear ove. the outcome, of optimistic and pess. imlstic appraisals of the nature of the probable resolution, of anxiety, of uncertainty, and of distraction on the part of concerned onlookers who cease many or their "normal" activities during the t^nse waiting perloci of the critical stage. The disease analogy, including the psychological s de-effects just referred to, draws on well-known situations experienced by observers--such as diptheria cases In the 20 s when the physician would announce to friends and relatives that he had done everything he could and, that, tor the next 72 hours or so, all anyone could do would be to wait for the typical signs that forecast the outcome.
The ordinary psychological reaction to the physician's announcement is an additional dimension that Is carried over to public affairs through the translated Image. This Is, on the one hand, a reluctant acknowledgement that power to direct matters has been lost momentarily and, on the other hand, a strong Impulse to get somebody to make a decision and to try some further control measure before It Is too late.
Tne recent conceptualizing of international crisis, it s easy to see, has urawn heavily on ehe "folk knowledge" imate of the medical crisis. A crisis marks an important upset in the functioning of the international system. The old idea of a mechanical balance where the "system" remains inactive and at rest in equilibrium until it is disturbed by a force is replaced by a notion of complex/ ongoing/ overall "system" activity within some "normal range." Many small upsets and malfunctionings are accommodated but there also are occasional large and important disturbances that threaten the normal range operations of the international system. The outbreak of large-scale violence is but one of the possible important disturbances.
Oran Young/ Andrew Scott/ and many others have set forth abstract definitions of international crises along this line of system thought. The essential theme connects the crisis concept to the impact of a major disturbance on the "living balance" or homeostasis of a system being stressed away from Its usual operating condition. (12) Many critics who surely use the term "crisis" In their ordinary daily speaking and writing become outraged when they note such "systemic" definitions and they complain against the employment of "organismlc analogies." I see nothing wrong in the use of this particular abstraction/ however/ provided the homeostatic regulation and disturbance insight can be shown to fit the social domain and. In particular/ the actual functioning of the international system. In any case, the baseline notion/ either in ordinary folk knowledge terms or In system jargon/ stems from the understanding of the sort of thing/ in general/ that takes place in the instance of somebody contracting e serious disease like diptheria.
When we turn to the psychological attributes associated with the everyday concept of crisis and consider how they have been elevated and expanded through recent scholarly analyses/ we find the origin/ again/ in the medical or disease analogy. Look in this light/ for instance/ at Hermann's triad of high threat/ short time, and surprise. (13) By Hermann's requirements/ all three of these
The decision-maker faced by an emergency foreign policy problem, like trie physician with a patient in a critical turning point condition, is very likely to feel the pressure to act quickly--to try to do something immediately to control the direction of events. There is a meta-decisional problem here:
that of finding a level of behavior between the extremes of under-reaction and over-reaction. Reacting too little and ton slowly may cause the decision-maker/ as was said in Britain in the 1930 , s, to miss the bus. Reacting too vigorously may easily propel affairs toward an unwanted catastrophic outcome. The sad medical history of the last days of Charles II of England is, perhaps, the pacesetting example of all time by decision-makers who try too much too fast-in this instance, physicians who wished "to leave no stones unturned in his treatment." The treatment undertaken, according to contemporary records, included in part: one pint of blood taken from the left arm eight ounces of blood cupped from the shoulder an enetic and purgative admin! steed an enema consisting of antimony, sacred bitters / fennel seed, linseed/ cinnamon, saphron, cochineal and aloes a blister raised on the shaven scalp sneezing powder of hellebore root administered cowslip powder to "strengthen the brain" given soothing drinks of barley water, licorice and sweet almond soothing drinks of white wine, absinthe and anise a plaster on the feet of Burgundy pitch and pigeon dung further bleeding and purging further medication Including melon seeds, manna, slippery elm, black cherry water/ flowers of lime/ Illy of the valley/ peony/ lavender/ and dissolved pearls.
and
As the King's condition worsened/ Raleigh's antidote bezoar stone were tried.
"As a sort of grand summary to this pharmaceutical debauch a mixture of Raleigh's antidote/ pearl julep, and ammonia was forced down the throat of the dying King." (Id) Over-response to perceptions of strong threats to important values and of short decision-making time due to the apparent acceleration of the pace of events is noted to be one of the principal dangers of international crises when this topic is fe^M -^--^^ . . There is a facet of time not noted by Robinson but hven if we accept the "fact" that some omplex of purposes, «»oals, and objectives Is active under crisis conultlons without our being able to say just what the complex is, we are then faced by the additional conceptual obstacle of change. Values shift their elements and their configuration in modern societies. Group aspirations vary over time and "permanent Interests,"
If there are such, achieve uifferent contexts In successive historical periods. Case studies of International crises have Indlcr^od that one aspect of crisis experience frequently is a quite rapid shift in the context of goal-seeking. There often is a shift In the terms of settlement the participants would be willing to accept. If a crisis is severe and tends toward stalemate, the Initial objectives of the parties In conflict ordinarily will be trimmed back as the crisis continues. (18) The valuational approach appears to be both too complex and too variable to undergird any stable and universal definition or theory of cri sis.
The oldest explanation of the coming of International crises Is Immun« to the uncertainties and relativities that well up from the psychological source. It suffers other drawbacks, however. The progressive hardening of the lines of conflict betv/een the members of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente In Europe In the pre-19U period appeared to be the cau-e of the series of clashes and crises that culminated in the Sarajevo Crisis In the summer of 191U. The generalization drawn from this experience Is that whenever üreat Powers join opposing armed camps and solidify their relations In committing alliances and alignments, political pressures will grow and the room to maneuver for settlementr, accommodations, and compromises will shrink. Crises erupc at pressure points and they become Increasingly difficult to resolve without pulling the opposing alliance members into war. Each crisis Is worse than the previous one so that the occurrence of each marks a step closer to war. (19) It Is this structural theory of crisis, based mainly on the pre-World War I experiences, that Is In accord with the popular assumption that crises always represent a threat of approaching war.
The concept of Increasing pressure can be replaced by the concept of a finely-adjusted balance. The mechanical analogy of equilibrium can be Invoked so that a balance of power among nations can be Imagined. Given a fine balance--an almost exact counterpoise--, the Image Is raised
15 that d small disturbance (i.e./ a crisis) would be capable of producing larte effects of unbalancing. On the other hand/ the notion of growing pressure in a confined polivical space is more powerful because it permits an a1tern<itive explanation/ namely/ that a series of crises lets off excessive pressure/ and thereby may become a preventive or a meliorative influence against the outbreak of w.'ii-. The proposition emerües from this idea that «.ne longer th? run of crises, the less the probability of a war outcome. (20 Affect influences the definition by adding a key to the cognitive product so that the latter Is "Important" or "trivial," or "ordinary" or "unusual," or "fear-arousing" or "gratifying," or "relevant" or "irrelevant," or some other (or added) potential of evaluation and emotion in a multidimensional "mental space." n constant process In the individual works on the fitting of received, specific, place-and-tlme bounded events Into dynamic affective/cognitive structures.
Each event., "within one's ken" Is unique in Its actual time-place status but each is treated Intrapsychlcal1y as a member of a class The calibration of self with others in the social bonding process is the same for the modern man as for the villager in that It is based both on direct. Immediately perceived experience with events and on the communicated reports received from others. The significant difference is that under modern national circumstances, the proportions have changed greatly.
If we take the image of the common life-sharing, integrated culture situation of the villager as the standard of comparison, we see that a much greater part of the modern man's socio-cultural calibration Is based on communicated reports. Cognitive structuring becomes a matter of fitting "part life" pieces mostly acquired from remote sources at second or third hand into a mosaic. This Is not easily accomplished. The effect is simple and Is known to all moderns. Given the constant torrent of arriving tele-sights, tele-sounds and other abstracted representations, one picks <jnd chooses only a miniscule part for attention and remembering. The personal equation is one key in the process of selective perception: "does this I tern in the news, this persuasive message, or this supplied Interpretaton apply to me?" The transmission of the public news about the coming of a foreign war Is translated by mothers, for example, into the anxious question of whether their children will have to fight and be killed In the war. The checking of messages for personal relevance results In the turning aside of most. In the matter of personal response to alarm signals, to warning messages, and to reports of impending dangers, so many of these are carried along in the public communication flow about so many different situations that the Individual develops a defense of indifference against them. Individual adaptation leads to the rejection or ignoring of most of such threat-bearing signals. The more advanced, the more intricately organized, and the more vulnerable to breakdown the interlocked specialized Institutions of contemporary national societies become, the higher the threshold of indifference rises in the collective reception of reports of threat.
The second factor In the shared processing of the alarm-warning-threat elements In the public communication flow is the symbolic re-representation of the substantial content of arriving messages.
The proposition that the medium is the message becomes sensible whei we recognize that the repetitions, day after day, of the "stories" of the news of thj day seen In newspapers and magazines and on radio and television programs generate a "second order" effect In audiences.
Like inspectors on a production line manufacturing countless numbers of glass bottles, audiences scan configuratIvely, for "sameness" and "difference" In the passing Items. Audiences also pay attention to the quantitative variations
In the flow, itself. On some rare days, "nothing happens" in the news. The tendency is to evaluate not each item, one ?t a time, but, instead, to inspect whole sets or lots In sequential series. This assembly line perspective is enhanced by the development of however. An approximate abstract description that emphasizes the circulation of reciprocal Influences and effects Is the better concept. It Is to be kept In mind, also, that how a problem gets to the top of the public policy agenda In the United States would not be the same In France and the Soviet Union. Different but comparably complex processes wou.d be expected In other modern countries. The Cobb and Elder formulation has the merit of stressing the complexity of agenda-bulIdlng and It offsets the stereotype of the government and the press In a conspiracy to feed the national society a small and selected diet of public Issues.
The filters and the selection procedures produce a phenomenon of considerable Importance for the understanding of the relationship between threat and crisis. At the governmental end, the reaction to the vast and constantly Incoming stream of matters represented as urgent and requiring attention is to reduce these to routine as far as possible. Modernized governments have built up proliferated administrative systems to cope with this traffic. Those items that fail tj get Into the public spotlight and on the national agenda are shunted to the administrative organizations for handling. This is also where most of the reports that carry elements of warning and threat regarding forthcoming societal dangers go. The administrative function is to buffer such signals and to respond to Issues and problems so that they stay within some "normal" bounds and do not develop Into emergencies and crises. The thankless task of middle and lower level bureaucrats Is to cope and buffer. Here Is an Institutional counterpart to the raising of the threshold of Indifference by the modern Individual as protection against the constant bombardment of warnings and threats. What the bureaucat most tries to do Is to avert "heat."
"Heat" Is an expression borrowed recently by politics from movie gangster argot to describe the impact of pressure and publicity. Heat is to the administrative apparatus what threat Is to the collectivity of individuals In the national society. In both, the effect is to cause a break In routines and a reformulation of expectations. The devotion to routines presided over by sub-organizational units In government, where there is a stake In such maintenance, provides for some stability In the social system. The benefits to order brought about by holding to standard operating procedures are offset, however, by a loss In the capacity to meet problems that will become catastrophic unless they are dealt with promptly. Most of the time, situations calling for system adjustments and corrections In the national society are treated Incrementally. Small, The buslness-as-usual approach applies also to most of the issues that achieve a place on the national agenda. From time to time, there is a switch in the approach, however, k^hen administrators feel "heat" in a situation, they know instinctively thai the odds are decreasing that orderly routines will be thrown to the winds, and that an emergency mode of operation will take command. The monitoring by the news media brings about a focusing of attention on a series of events causing the latter to become significant. It often happens that very similar kinds of events have been reported previously without the effect of making them noteworthy. The difference is accounted for when a series of reported events fits in with a latent threat region and spurs the cognitive transition to an active threat field. Psychological stress appears and spreads, the feeling of the need to act emerges, uncertainty grows, and a sense of urgency develops. The routine administrative hold on the affair weakens. The barrier of indifference of the audience lowers so that more heeu Is given to warnings and to threat messages. As these things happen, the emergency mode of response progressively challenges the routine procedures. Nothing works more surely and more swiftly than the conjunction of reported events with an active threat image to bring an Issue out of the crowd and to the front on an agenda of public affairs. Past patterns of response that matched past threat situations are brought into play, commonly. It must be known "whot to do" to engage in a crisis.
For example, one can argue from the emergency response conceptualization that the oil embargo of the winter of An episode publicized recently in Los Angeles Is a concrete illustration. The triggering event was the fall of a large and heavy palm tree across the roof of a small house. The tree had been planted many years before by the city.
The homeowner was a man of modest means/ long employed but at the moment thrown out of work like many others by the recession. The "threat region" being shared by many of the possibility of the loss of income may have had some bearing on what followed next. The homeowner sought help.
The tree had to be removed, he felt the tree was too large for his own efforts and he judged he could not pay for Its removal.
Therefore, he turned to the agencies of city government for assistance.
At each office and agency, he found understanding and, sometimes, sympathy for his problem but no help.
Everywhere, rules and regulations forbade action by the municipal offices. At the homeowner's point of
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Requisite and launching is the unshared culture sources for much prior to these preparations for crisis habituation of the national populace to structures and to mass communication of the organization and content of the individual's cognitive map.
It should be apparent without making a great point of It that national societies act and respond in other ways than through the event-threat-crisis pattern to institute programs and to work toward shared objectives.
In the governmental direction of the "home affairs" of a nation, the crisis route as described here is followed relatively rarely.
It seems to be the case that the appearance of crisis behavior is more frequent In foreign affairs. From the history of the past thirty years of American experience, it is more difficult to recall instances In domestic affairs that match the requirements and requisites than in foreign affairs. A third image of bodily hurt that may arise from the interpretation of foreign events is the possibility of being physically bound, held, encircled, besieged, or imprisoned. Constraint on movement is a distinct kind of somatic threat.
A fourth type occurs in the prospect of being shut off from essentials required to maintain life. Squeezing, smothering, seizing, throttling, starving, isolating, and excluding are among the descriptors of tnis threat Image. Such a somatic representation cf external threat is generated frequently by an awareness that access to a place, to an essential resource, or to some vital process Is being closed down progressively. French foreign policy in the late nineteenth century "scramble for Africa" was built from the argument that, unless France took her "share" of African territory, there woiJd be, later on, a deprivation of raw materials and manpower. These would have fallen into t'.e hands of competing European countries and there would be no way at a later time to gain access to increasingly scarce resources. This anticipation of threat against access and future survival gave the direction to French colonial policy in that era.
How much importance should be assigned to the influence of somatic symbols of threat in foreign affairs? In the reduction of the complexities of international situations to terms simple and understandable enough to support collective national actions, do the anxiety Images of bodily harm very frequently play a major part? The danger in responding to these questions oorr^s from the possibility that an observer can be reflecting more his personal philosophical and social outlook than assessing the actual state of affairs. 
